((وبلاگ علمی دانشمندان حقوق ایران فردا))

In the post-Pervez Musharraf political environment of Pakistan, a short-lived sense of

hopefulness emerged that the democratically elected leader, Asif Ali Zardari, would

stabilize the country. Since September 2008, when he came to power, the opposite has

occurred. Although the country’s precipitous fall into turmoil is not Zardari’s doing, he

is haplessly at the helm of a Pakistan that is even more violent than recent decades. There

are a myriad of political and military calamities throughout the country that contribute to

its near failed state status. Currently, Pakistan is one of the least stable countries

possessing nuclear weapons; the economy is crippled; Kashmir remains contentious; the

northwest region, known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) harbors

exiled Taliban leaders and al Qaeda’s leadership; and there is an ongoing radicalization

throughout the country—ot limited to the FATA. As seen in the December 2008 attacks

on Mumbai, the security of countries near and far could be gravely affected by Pakistan’s

inability to reign in terrorist elements. This ominous situation is why stabilizing the

country is one of the most pressing issues for the international community.

International attention has increasingly focused on the global implications of the

FATA as a terrorist save haven and how best to eradicate the radicalization and threats

that emanate from the region. In particular, the US has voiced concern that Taliban and

possibly members of al Qaeda are launching cross border attacks, from the FATA, on US

military personnel and other coalition forces in Afghanistan. These attacks have lead to

military incursions by the US and a generally deteriorating security situation. The main

question explored is: How can the international community combat the radicalization and

terrorist groups residing in this border region if the US is to move beyond unilateral

actions in the FATA? While some terrorist experts have identified a growing trend of

non-geographically based terrorism, the FATA may be an anomaly as it provides a

physical and symbolic enclave for the al Qaeda structure and its subsidiary organization,

the Taliban. While focusing mainly on the FATA, this paper also outlines the major

factors contributing to Pakistan’s destabilization, the global security implications and

complexity of resolving Pakistan’s status as a failed state.

terms of failed states, coming after the Ivory Coast in eighth place and Afghanistan in

developing countries was fairly high. Twelve criteria and a composite score determined

the ranking, and in areas such as “Factionalized Elite,” “Security Apparatus” and

“Delegitimazation of State”, Pakistan ranked especially poorly.

Another view of Pakistan is that it is not a failed state but possesses a

factionalized elite and government that is unable to manage parts of the country,

especially the territory near Afghanistan. A third view almost entirely dismisses Pakistan

Semantics aside, if Pakistan is not a “failed state” yet, it has other trappings of a highly

unstable one with a divided elite, vulnerable government and a deteriorating security

environment overall.

may become a global trend. Increasingly, states that suffer from the dual affliction of

poverty and terrorism are often unable to contend with either situation effectively, and

both perniciously feed into one another as a country’s inability to manage security issues

creates disincentives for foreign direct investment. Pakistan has increasingly appeared as

a dangerous country for investors, and that view was confirmed as a symbol of Western

culture, the Islamabad Marriot, was bombed in September 2008. And even as

governments attempt to facilitate adequate investor climates and uphold rule of law to

promote foreign direct investment, their first priority must be towards fighting terrorism.

However, to effectively combat terrorism, the state should possess significant authority

and legitimacy, and if it lacks authority in the economic realm, it must regain authority by

presenting the semblance that it is in control of the state’s security environment. This

boost to authority, unfortunately, is usually only short-lived. As James Rosenau explains:

As the legitimacy of the Pakistani government has diminished due to issues such as the

economy and deteriorating security, the country’s turbulence has been exacerbated by

terrorist groups benefiting from globalization and finding an ideal haven in the border

attracted foreign fighters, an exchange of ideas (especially tactical) amongst terrorists,

and has given the best known terrorist brand name—al Qaeda, an enclave and hub to

continue a global jihad. While globalization and poverty have facilitated terrorism in

Pakistan, other issues have also contributed to the rise of radical movements such as

historical factors and Islamabad’s lack of authority in the FATA. For the Pakistani

government, securing the region and effectively asserting its authority and legitimacy is

crucial. How to achieve this is what has eluded the Pakistani government if one believes

that they are committed to improving their economic state of affairs and remedying their

domestic security concerns.

Pakistan’s failed state status, if one accepts this characterization, has been greatly

affected by the restive FATA region. Furthermore, the alliance between the Taliban and

al Qaeda has signified both groups’ ability to spread their influence in the region; ability

to collect intelligence to execute opponents, diplomats or western aid workers in nearby

regions; increased movement of jihadists from other countries; and an economy propped

up by drug trafficking, which continues to fuel radical Islamists’ staying power.

The FATA is composed of autonomous tribal agencies, and possesses isolated

villages surrounded by rugged mountainous terrain—ll of which create obstacles for

administration by the government. According to Rajon Menon, a scholar on Pakistan and

Central Asia, the region is, “…prime real estate for al-Qaeda. The local regimes are

weak and ill-equipped to infiltrate and disrupt a major terrorist organization, which can

gain recruits because there are so many deep-rooted problems and discontented young

described Pakistan as the most dangerous country in the world; however, it may be that

the FATA is the most dangerous territory in the world. The political history of the

Pakistan and Afghan border region has created an environment fertile for the

establishment of radical groups.

Historically, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which lasted from 1979 until

1989, was characterized by Pakistani involvement in supporting the CIA-backed Afghan

Pakistan has a complex evolution but is explored here only in a cursory way. However,

the allegiances that have been built in the region during the Afghan war, especially with

the Pashtun tribal leadership and during the ascent of the Taliban, have strongly

influenced the current state of the FATA.

With the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the plight of the

Afghans became a rallying point or jihad for many Muslims who used Pakistan’s border

regions to set up military training camps. The CIA, along with significant funding from

the Saudi Arabian government, began funneling money to the mujahedin fighters in

arming and supplying the mujahedin, with the Pakistanis as the gatekeepers of funding.

It was also in the early 1980s that Osama bin Laden’s ventures into Pakistan to courier

money from wealthy Saudis and his eventual residency in Peshawar (the largest city in

The Pakistani government, starting with General Mohammed Zia ul Haq to

General Pervez Musharraf, backed the mujahedin, and later Taliban elements, even when

Afghan war, General Zia helped establish madrassas—many of which inculcated

Afghanis and Pakistanis with extreme religious views—and military training camps in

war during the Soviet invasion and grew up in refugee camps in Pakistan. By the 1980s

Pakistan’s political involvement with Afghanistan did not end once the Soviets

withdrew in 1989. The mujahedin, a few of whom were the predecessors of the Taliban

movement in Afghanistan, had lived and been educated in the Pakistani refugee camps

and madrassas and their world vision was shaped in the tribal areas and the North-West

Frontier Province. The Taliban realized that although the Soviets had been forced out,

Afghanistan’s one-time liberators, the mujahedin, had become corrupt and lawless.

themselves from the party politics of the Mujaheddin and signaled that they were a

Rashid notes that Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan and near unconditional backing

for the Taliban when they emerged in 1994 had much to do with gaining a strong military

foothold in Afghanistan to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the Indians, especially in

Intelligence (ISI) fervently supported and personally believed in the agenda of the

Taliban.

In 2001, after the US’s military campaign in Afghanistan that ousted the Taliban

from power, many members of the Taliban retreated to the FATA, or Pakistan in general,

to establish an exile base. And since Osama bin Laden had been a key benefactor to the

leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, he also moved his operation to the mountainous

border region. The adverse repercussions for the Pakistanis after having supported the

Taliban would come to haunt them. As Rashid says, “…the Taliban gave sanctuary and

armed the most violent Sunni extremist groups in Pakistan, who killed Pakistani Shias,

wanted Pakistan declared a Sunni state and advocated the overthrow of the ruling elite

through an Islamic revolution…In fact the backwash from Afghanistan was leading to the

The Taliban’s assimilation into the region as well as influence over local Pashtun and

other groups in the FATA meant a governing challenge for the Pakistani government,

especially with the Taliban in a strategic alliance with al Qaeda.

The FATA’s violence and poverty have pushed its inhabitants into a dire situation.

Approximately 3.1 million people live in the FATA— region of abject poverty and in

desperate need of economic assistance. As reported in a US government report, the

FATA:

The poverty and presence of the Taliban in the FATA is already troublesome but other

factors complicate the ability for Pakistan to address this regional crisis. Some of these

issues include the British colonial legacy of FATA administration, the contentious

Durand Line and tribal culture loyal to the Taliban—all of which have made the border

regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan porous and untenable.

The remaining British colonial administration looms large in the Pakistanis’ ability to

manage the FATA. Notably, from a legal framework and as described in a US

government report, “FATA residents do not have access to national political parties, and

political parties are forbidden from extending their activities into the agencies of

instead a remnant of British rule, and the FATA residents have not replaced it, in part

because the status quo allows for significant autonomy. In addition, the Afghan

government has not recognized the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan—also

known as the Durand Line. As described by a leading authority on Afghanistan, “On the

Pakistani side of the Durand Line, the British and their Pakistani successors turned the

difficulty of governing the tribes to their advantage by establishing what are now the

FATA. Within the FATA, these tribes, not the government, are responsible for

government to coordinate delicate military operations, build up basic infrastructure and

provide governance in the region.

Due to the lack of administration in the region, the Taliban have not only settled

in the FATA and in parts of the North-West Frontier Province, they have also co-opted

tribal leaders to create an administration whereby they can impose their strict Islamic

lifestyle and system of justice on the population. The tribal chiefs and clans are highly

important and have been reluctant to recognize the authority from Islamabad and instead

many accept Taliban rule. The pervasive tribalism (particularly the prominence of the

Pashtun ethnic tribes) and the historic ties to the mujahedin/Taliban leadership

established during the Afghan-Soviet War have allowed the Taliban’s influence to

become widespread in the FATA.

The Taliban serving as a de facto political and administrative authority in the

FATA has already meted out harsh justice to those who do not abide by the Taliban’s

rules. Beheadings and other forms of public punishment to instill fear into the locals are

on the rise. Recently, however, villagers in parts of the border region have voiced

Attempts by residents to escape the rule of the Taliban have had mixed results since the

new strategy to arm the villagers has not always been effective and sometimes even

Overall, Pakistan’s historic legacies have contributed to the present situation in

the FATA. The Pakistani’s inability to effectively exert political authority or deliver

adequate services in order to improve relations with tribal leaders has resulted in the

Taliban filling in the governance vacuum. This scenario has also forced the US to take

initiatives to secure the region (at least partially) through military strikes since the US

views the Taliban as directly targeting US and coalition troops all the while using the

FATA as a safe haven.

The Pakistani government’s limited political authority has complicated any concerted

effort by outside forces to help the government thwart terrorism and rid them of extremist

groups who have strategically taken up residence in the forsaken FATA. The US has

voiced concern over Pakistan’s marginal progress fighting al Qaeda and Taliban elements

in the country. The tenuous situation has lead to both sides unsatisfied with the level of

cooperation each offers. The US’s chief concern and complaint is that cross border

attacks emanating from the FATA have been directed towards American and NATO

personnel as well as military installations in Afghanistan. On the Pakistani side, the

“targeted” bombings using drones have resulted in collateral damage and contribute to

further argues that the bombings contribute to ire against Americans and undermine the

Since its beginning, controversy has surrounded the US’s strategic bombing in the

FATA in terms of the violation of Pakistani sovereignty and collateral damage. The US

has not publicly acknowledged using drones to target suspected Taliban leaders or al

Qaeda members, but because the US is the only country in the region with the military

technology to execute this campaign, it is almost a foregone conclusion. As attacks in the

region have increased, debate over the utility or futility of the US’s cross-border

incursions into Pakistan has emerged.

Those opposed to these targeted military actions include former intelligence

officers, scholars and policy makers. Some Pakistan observers have argued that the

bombings are ineffective and will only harden the resolve of terrorists and complicate the

position of the Zardari government. Scholars such as Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid

contend that the strikes are inadequate without a comprehensive regional solution. In

terms of the US’s intelligence gathering capacity, Robert Baer, a former CIA field officer

in the Middle East writes:

Those advocating military action include a range of Pakistan observers—from military

scholars to intellectual elites—who see the utility of continued cross-border incursions if

the Pakistanis cannot control the FATA. Therefore, the US—all the while not admitting

responsibility for the incursions—has no other options than to target terrorists by relying

on high tech surveillance. The proponents of selective military strikes include military

scholar, Anthony Cordesman, who argues that the US cannot wait if Pakistan will not act

an investigative reporter and writer has voiced similar concerns and has noted that the

York Times journalists explained: “The White House has adopted a clear position to

justify those attacks [in the FATA]: if a country cannot deal with a terrorism problem on

Another key criticism by the US of the Pakistanis is the role that the Inter-

Services Intelligence (ISI) plays in fighting radicalization. The ISI and the Zardari

government do not always appear to be working towards a common goal. The ISI’s

activities factor into Pakistan’s failed state status, which is plagued by a rouge security

magazine and Fund for Peace “Failed States Index 2008.” As part of the military, the ISI

has excellent intelligence gathering capacity and wields great power throughout the

country. The ISI had worked with the CIA during the Afghan-Soviet war sharing

intelligence but has increasingly become an embarrassment if not detriment to the

Pakistani government. One Muslim Indian politician suggests that ISI is not only

reluctant to help the US with intelligence regarding Taliban and al Qaeda members, but is

on the ISI for intelligence, it must surreptitiously launch strikes so that the ISI does not

warn Taliban members.

Even if the ISI has a divided loyalty between the government and militants,

military forces are positioned around the FATA. Its progress in removing militants,

however, is hindered due to low moral—in part because of soldiers’ repulsion at Muslim

Furthermore, the military and increasingly law enforcement are targeted by suicide

success continues to be daunting due to low moral and the lack of a residual force in the

region. An Indian-Sikh military scholar and retired brigadier proposes: “One method that

can be adopted is to establish an interlinked grid of company-sized ‘posts’ to dominate

given areas, conduct patrolling and strike operations based on hard intelligence and,

simultaneously, enable the civil administration to execute development projects and run

need to combine their targeted attacks with infrastructure development and continue to

garner hard intelligence which is difficult to obtain.

President-elect Barack Obama, early into his presidential campaign asserted that

if he had high-level intelligence he would consider bombing al Qaeda targets in the

border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan—something which is believed to be

have been ongoing even before his declaration was made. The objection to Obama’s

statement was initially that this tactic would violate Pakistan’s sovereignty and weaken

our strategic partner. The sovereignty issue, however, has been side-stepped, possibly

because the Zardari government is seen as emasculated or subservient to the military.

One could also speculate that the Pakistani government is not altogether opposed to these