From the beginning, the United States and its partners insisted that they were establishing a democratic Iraq that would soon be a model for the entire region. But in practice, they ruled with minimal consultation and little understanding of the country and its people. For a year, the Coalition Provisional Authority ruled Iraq from its confines in the Green Zone, promulgating orders, decrees, memoranda and public notices. [55] Most of the CPA staff worked on six-month assignments and had little opportunity to learn about the country before heading home. [56]
Bremer and the CPA set up a “Governing Council” made up of US-handpicked Iraqis, friendly to the occupation. [57] Many had spent decades in exile and they had few roots in contemporary Iraq . Some, like Iyad Allawi and Ahmad Chalabi, had worked for years directly on Washington 's payroll. [58] By naming the Governing Council on the basis of sectarian affiliation and “balance,” the CPA gave prominence to the sectarian dimension of Iraqi politics and deepened sectarian rivalries. [59] “Divide-and-rule” tactics seemed to be at work.
At the end of June 2004, the CPA turned over “sovereignty” to Iraqis and dissolved itself. The Coalition announced that a “sovereign” Iraqi Interim Government was now in charge and in New York the Security Council welcomed the transition. [60] The new Interim Government had been hand picked by Bremer, with the assistance of UN special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi. Though supposedly composed of technocrats, it contained familiar personalities, chosen and presented (again) according to sectarian identity. [61] CIA-linked Allawi was the new Prime Minister. Bremer finally departed with most of his staff, but an enormous US presence remained.
The trappings of sovereignty had been put in place. Iraq again had ministries, civil servants, a nascent police force and army, as well as prisons, a Ministry of Finance, even an intelligence service. And, of course, there were elections -- touted by the Coalition as proof of success and the ultimate benchmark of democracy. But the reality was quite different. Ambassador John Negroponte, who followed Bremer, continued to exercise overwhelming influence in the country, at the head of the world's largest US embassy. Each ministry had dozens of US “advisors” guiding policy. [62] The army was entirely under US command and the intelligence service took its orders (and payroll) from the CIA. [63]
The initial elections for the 275-member Iraqi National Assembly took place on January 30, 2005 . Because of dangerous security conditions, international election experts supervised the elections from outside the country, relying on information from mostly partisan Iraqi monitors. The International Mission for Iraqi Elections declared that the elections “generally met recognized standards.” [64] Critics , though, complained that the elections were organized on a flawed basis with a single national constituency and unified lists of candidates, that no meaningful campaigning had been possible, and that the elections had taken place under conditions that violate international human rights standards. [65] Another cloud over the election was the extremely low Sunni turn out.
The process of drafting and approving a new Constitution was also problematic, leading to further sectarian rancor. The referendum ground-rules, stipulated in the interim constitution, were changed at the last minute before the vote of October 15, 2005 [66] and voting irregularities cast a shadow over the results. [67] Instead of the widely-expected rejection, the constitution was declared adopted. Parliamentary elections followed on December 15 with an outcome that gave power to sectarian blocs of Kurdish and Shia parties. The political process had become increasingly sectarian and rising violence made issue-based campaigning virtually impossible. When finally a new constitutional parliament took office in early 2006, the fleeting hopes generated by the elections had already begun to fade among the Iraqi public. Months of maneuvering were required to form a government. The political leadership under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki proved weak, sectarian and incapable of uniting the country. Symbolically sited in the fortified Green Zone along with the huge US embassy, the parliament and the government leaders had little room for political maneuver. Corruption flourished in the ministries. Militias multiplied. The government's authority scarcely had any meaning, inside or outside the Green Zone.
A Landscape of Massive Illegality
In the chapters that follow, this report examines the tragic landscape of the occupation. It shows in detail how US forces used indiscriminate and especially injurious weapons and how the Coalition failed to act to prevent the destruction of Iraqi institutions and cultural heritage, including hospitals, universities, libraries, museums and archeological sites. The report also shows how the Coalition used massive military might that badly damaged or destroyed a dozen of Iraq 's cities, displacing hundreds of thousands of people.
Coalition forces have held thousands of Iraqis in unlimited detention without charge or trial, subjecting many to abusive interrogation and torture. Coalition troops routinely kill Iraqi civilians at checkpoints, during house searches, and during military operations of all kinds and Coalition troops have committed murder and atrocities. A “reconstruction” program has squandered billions of dollars in Iraqi funds through theft, fraud and gross malfeasance.
The report documents how hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died. More than four million have been displaced, including over two million that have fled the country. Poverty is widespread, illness and mortality of children exceptionally high, and food insecurity rising steadily. Iraqis vigorously oppose the long-term bases that the US is constructing and the enormous embassy complex that symbolizes hegemony. By an overwhelming majority, Iraqis want the Coalition to withdraw, as repeated public opinion polls show.
For some readers, the broad themes of the report will be familiar. But the chapters seek a deeper and more complete picture than has previously been available. The report describes a landscape of massive illegality and violence. Documenting the many gross violations of international law, the report calls on the international community to address the Iraq crisis and find alternatives for the future. Peace cannot return to Iraq as long as the occupation continues.
Next Chapter: "Destruction of Cultural Heritage"
[1] White House, Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice ( April 4, 2003 )
[2] Yochi J. Dreazen and Christopher Cooper, “Behind the Scenes, US Tightens Grip on Iraq 's Future” Wall Street Journal ( May 13, 2004 ). Also see Bradley Graham and Robin Wright, “ Aid to Iraq Ministries To Shift to Pentagon” Washington Post ( September 26, 2005 )
[3] See Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam's War Machine ( Boston , 1997)
[4] The sanctions continued for many years against the wishes of most members of the Security Council because the US and the UK could use their vetoes to block any effort to bring the sanctions regime to an end. See Global Policy Forum et al, Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Options and Implications for the Future (August, 2002)
[5] UN Security Council Meeting 4701 on Iraq , Verbatim Transcript S/PV.4701 ( February 5, 2003 ) p.5
[6] See US Central Intelligence Agency, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD ( September 30, 2004 )
[7] Richard Clarke, Against all Enemies ( New York , 2004) Clarke was the chief counter-terrorism expert on the National Security Council in the Bush administration's early years.
[8] Sir Christopher Meyer, DC Confidential ( London , 2005). Meyer was the UK ambassador in Washington at the time.
[9] “Iraq: Prime Minister's Meeting, 23 July [2002]” Secret memorandum of a meeting of senior UK civil servants and ministers at 10 Downing Street, leaked to the Sunday Times and published May 1, 2005. Its authenticity has never been disputed. See Walter Pincus, “British Intelligence ‘Warned of Iraq War'” Washington Post ( May 3, 2005 )
[10] Assessment of the British Government, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction ( September 24, 2002 ) and UK 10 Downing Street, Iraq : Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation ( February 3, 2003 )
[11] “Powell Calls Pre-Iraq U.N. Speech a ‘Blot' on his Record” Associated Press ( September 8, 2005 )
[12] Lord Goldsmith, the chief legal officer of the UK government dissented from the self-defense argument in his private advice to the Prime Minister (March 7, 2003), saying that only a resolution of the Security Council authorizing the use of force would make the UK military engagement legal under international law
[13] Ross worked at the UK 's UN Mission for four and a half years, from December 1997 until June 2002. His testimony was kept secret and only made public 30 months later after pressure from members of Parliament. See “Full Transcript of Evidence given to the Butler Inquiry, Supplementary Evidence Submitted by Mr. Carne Ross, Director, Independent Diplomat,” dated June 9, 2004, published by the Independent (December 15, 2006). See Colin Brown and Andy McSmith, “Diplomat's Suppressed Document Lays Bare the Lies Behind Iraq War” Independent ( December 15, 2006 )
[14] US Senate, 109 th Congress, 2 nd Session, Report of the Select Intelligence Committee on Postwar Findings on Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments (September 8, 2006). A report by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, released to the Congress on April 5, 2007 , came to the same conclusion. See “Hussein-Qaeda Lind ‘Inappropriate,' Report Says” Bloomberg News ( April 6, 2007 )
[15]White House Press Release , Remarks by the President to the Military Personnel and Their Families
Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune , North Carolina ( April 3, 3003 )
[16] See DilipHiro, “Outside Powers,” in The Longest War (New York, 1991) and Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the US and Britain Secretly Built Saddam's War Machine ( Boston , 1997). Also see Human Rights Watch, Annual Report: Iraq (1989)
[17] White House Press Release , Iraq Coalition ( March 27, 2003 )
[18] See for example US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Patterns of Global Terrorism” ( April 29, 2004 ); US CENTCOM, “International Contributions to the War on Terror” ( January 10, 2005 ); Sewell Chan, “Rumsfeld Thanks Kazakhstan” Washington Post ( February 26, 2004 ); Globalsecurity.org, Iraq Coalition Troops (February 2007)
[19] Jim Garamone, “More than 100,000 Coalition Troops in Iraq ” American Forces Press Service ( March 31, 2003 )
[20] See chapter 3 of this report: Indiscriminate and Especially Injurious Weapons .
[21] The White House website notes that the Ministry of Health was “completely looted”. For details on the Oil Ministry see Andras Riedlmayer, “Yes the Oil Ministry Was Guarded” Iraq War and Archeology (May 7, 2003)
[22] See detailed information in Chapter 2: Destruction of Cultural Heritage.
[23] Department of Defense, News Briefing by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Meyers ( April 11, 2003 ). See Sean Loughlin, “Rumsfeld on Looting in Iraq ” CNN ( April 12, 2003 )
[24] See Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities ( May 23, 2003 )
[25] Toby Dodge, “Staticide in Iraq ” Le Monde diplomatique (February 2007)
[26] The US eventually took more than $8 billion – the remaining balances in the UN Oil-for-Food account.
[27] See UN Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1637(2005) and S/RES/1723 (2006)
[28] Maggie Farley and Richard Boudreaux, “ Mexico 's Envoy to UN Leaves, With Defiance ” Los Angeles Times ( November 22, 2003 )
[29] Private communication with former ambassadors on the Council.
[30] Bremer had served in the State Department for many years and from 1989-2000 had been a Managing Director of Kissenger Associates. His biographies describe him as a counter-terrorism expert. See the bio presented by the CPA website http://www.iraqcoalition.org/bremerbio.html
[31] See chapter 9 of this report: Corruption, Fraud and Gross Financial Negligence.
[32] In another incident on April 30, US forces opened fire again on a crowd, killing three and wounding sixteen. See Human Rights Watch, Violent Response: the U.S. Army in al-Falluja ( June 17, 2003 ) According to HRW, Fallujan protester were also outraged that US observers posted on the high rooftop could see into the privacy of local dwellings, dishonoring the women.
[33] See chapter 7 of this report: Killing Civilians, Murder and Atrocities .
[34] See chapter 4 of this report: Detention and Prisons .
[35] See chapter 5 of this report: Prisoner Abuse and Torture .
[36]Seymour Hersh, “Moving Targets” New Yorker ( December 15, 2003 ). Also see Matthew B. Stannard, “Special Forces Have Scoped Iraq for Weeks” San Francisco Chronicle ( March 21, 2003 )
[37] Thom Shanker, “Special Operations in Iraq : High Profile But in the Shadow,” New York Times ( May 29, 2007 ) and Human Rights First, “Command's Responsibility,” (February, 2006)
[38] The US Government Accountability Office estimated that as of March 2006 there were approximately 181 private security companies, with over 48,000 employees working in Iraq . See US Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, Statement of William Solis, Director Defense Capabilities and Management, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers (June 13, 2006)
[39] Human Rights Watch, Private Military Contractors and the Law ( May 5, 2004 )
[40] See Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater (New York, 2007) and Amnesty International USA, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Companies Operating in Iraq .
[41] See for instance Kenneth Katzman, “ Iraq : US Efforts to Change the Regime” Congressional Research Service ( March 22, 2002 ); Scott Peterson, “Kurds Ready to Be Next N. Alliance” Christian Science Monitors ( March 28, 2002 ); “US Intelligence Teaming up with Kurds” Houston Chronicle ( December 22, 2002 )
[42] Patrick E. Tyler, “ U.S. May Let Kurds Keep Arms, Angering Shiites” New York Times ( May 24, 2003 )
[43]US General Accounting Office , Report to Congressional Requesters, State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation ( April 2004)
[44] Johanna McGeary, “Who Will Call the Shots?” TIME ( April 14, 2003 )
[45] Knut Royce, “A Start-Up Company with Connections” Newsday ( February 15, 2004 )
[46] Dana Priest and Josh White, “Before the War, CIA Reportedly Trained a Team of Iraqis to Aid US” Washington Post ( August 3, 2005 )
[47] Human Rights First, Command's Responsibility (February 2006) p. 8. The detainee was Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush.
[48]Robert Dreyfuss, “ Phoenix Rising” The American Prospect Volume 15, Issue 1 ( January 1, 2004 )
[49]Michael Hirsh and John Barry, “The Salvador Option” Newsweek ( January 14, 2005 )
[50] Peter Maass, “The Way of the Commandos” New York Times Magazine ( May 1, 2005 ). Another important advisor who had been involved in US Latin American counter-insurgency operations was Steven Casteel.
[51] The Wall Street Journal identified six of these units. See Greg Jaffe, “New Factor in Iraq : Irregular Brigades Fill Security Void” Wall Street Journal ( February 16, 2005 ) and “Bands of Brothers New Factor in Iraq : Irregular Brigades Fill Security Void” Wall Street Journal ( February 23, 2005 ). See esp. A.K. Gupta, “Let a Thousand Militias Bloom” NYC Indymedia Center ( April 22, 2005 ) and A.K. Gupta, “ Iraq : Militias and Civil War” Z Magazine (December 2006)
[52] Lionel Beehner, “ Iraq : Militia Groups” Council on Foreign Relations ( June 9, 2005 )
[53] Michale Hirsch and John Barry, “Special Forces May Train Assassins, Kidnappers in Iraq ” Newsweek ( January 14, 2005 ) and Peter Maas, “The Way of the Commandoes” New York Times Magazine ( May 1, 2005 )
[54] Beehner, op.cit.
[55] Between May 2003 and June 2004, CPA Administrator Paul Bremer issued 100 orders, 12 regulations, 17 memoranda and 12 public notices. See Coalition Provisional Authority website: http://www.iraqcoalition.org
[56] Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Lessons in Human Capital Management (January 2006) p.14
[57] Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 6, Governing Council of Iraq ( July 13, 2003 )
[58] For example, see Joel Brinkley, “Ex-C.I.A. Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90's Attacks” New York Times ( June 9, 2004 )
[59] Raad Alkadiri and Chris Toensing , “The Iraqi Governing Council's Sectarian Hue” Middle East Research and Information Project ( August 20, 2003 )
[60] UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1546 (2004)
[61] Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 10, Members of Designated Iraqi Interim Government with Annex A (June 9, 2004)
[62] Yochi J. Dreazen and Christopher Cooper, “Behind the Scenes, US Tightens Grip on Iraq 's Future” Wall Street Journal ( May 13, 2004 ). Also see Bradley Graham and Robin Wright, “ Aid to Iraq Ministries To Shift to Pentagon” Washington Post ( September 26, 2005 )
[63] Ned Parker, “Divided Iraq Has Two Spy Agencies” Los Angeles Times ( April 15, 2007 )
[64] International Mission for Iraqi Elections, Final Report Assessment of the January 30, 2005 , Election Process (2005)
[65] Asian National Exchange for New Alternatives , Open Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on the Elections in Iraq ( January 26, 2005 )
[66] “UN Condemns Iraq Charter Change” BBC (October 4, 2005)
[67] For example, see Dexter Filkins, “Vote Totals Under Inquiry in 12 Iraqi Provinces, Panel Says” New York Times ( October 17, 2005 ); “Iraq Vote Counts ‘Points to Fraud'” BBC ( October 18, 2005 )
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